

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 00618 01 OF 05 241326Z

46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 AEC-11 IO-14 OIC-04

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 VIENNA 0618

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: AD HOC GROUP MEETING JAN 22, 1974

1. SUMMARY. THE AHG MEETING OF JANUARY 22 ADDRESSED THE EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT MADE EARLIER THAT MORNING; BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH THE EAST; AND THE POSITION PAPER ON ALLIED TACTICS FOR THE CURRENT SESSION. US REP REPORTED ON TWO BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION. HE NOTED THAT CONVERSATIONS SHOWED THAT THERE MIGHT BE A WARSAW PACT WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A COMMON CEILING IN AIR AND GROUND FORCES, SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE MANPOWER DISPARITY MAY BE CHANGING.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 01 OF 05 241326Z

2. UK REP HAD FINALLY RECEIVED DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS ON THE

TACTICS PAPER. HE STATED AUTHORITIES IN LONDON WERE CONCERNED THAT IN INTRODUCING FIXED PERIOD OF TIME, NATO MIGHT BE MAKING A SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION TO OBTAIN A MERE PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT; THEY WERE ALSO WORRIED THAT THE PAPER MIGHT COMMIT NATO TO REDUCTIONS OF THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND THAT IT MIGHT IMPLY NATO'S WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ENSUED. CHAIRMAN CONCLUDED THAT ISSUE COULD NOT BE RESOLVED AT THIS MEETING. END SUMMARY.

COMMENTS ON POLISH REP'S (STRULAK) STATEMENT OF 22 JAN 1974

3. CHAIRMAN (DANISH REP - TILLISCH) CALLED FOR ANALYSIS OF STRULAK'S SPEECH IN THAT MORNING'S PLENARY (TEXT SEPTTEL). U.S. REP CALLED ATTENTION TO STRULAK'S SURPRISE THAT THE WEST SHOULD INFER THAT THE DANGERS OF ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR CONFLICT WERE RELATED TO THE ACTIVITIES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES RATHER THAN TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. U.S. REP THOUGHT THIS WAS A POINT THE ALLIES SHOULD CLARIFY AND EXPAND IN FUTURE PLENARIES.

4. FRG REP (BEHREND) AGREED. HE NOTED THAT STRULAK WAS SAID TO HAVE GIVEN PRIORITY TO CRITICISMS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS BECAUSE THEY EXCLUDED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INDIGENOUS FORCES; THERE WAS ALMOST NO MENTION OF AIR FORCES. HE ALSO MENTIONED STRULAK'S STATEMENT THAT BY LIMITING REDUCTIONS TO ONLY US AND USSR FORCES, THE WESTERN PLAN WOULD INVITE AN ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THIS ARGUMENT SHOULD BE COUNTERED BY NOTING THAT AN ARMS RACE WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING.

5. NETHERLANDS REP (QUARLES) SAID THAT THE ALLIES MUST REPLY TO THE EASTERN CONTENTION THAT THE WESTERN PLAN CALLS FOR THE EAST TO REDUCE THREE TIMES AS MANY MEN AS THOSE TO BE REDUCED BY THE WEST AND THAT THIS WOULD ENDANGER EASTERN SECURITY. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD COUNTER THIS ARGUMENT BY AGAIN POINTING OUT THAT UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY ENDANGER SECURITY AND IN THIS CASE THEY WOULD ENHANCE IT; THE EAST'S DEFENSIVE PURPOSES WOULD STILL BE FULLY COVERED. THE NETHERLANDS REP COMMENTED THAT IN HIS VIEW  
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PAGE 03 VIENNA 00618 01 OF 05 241326Z

THE WHOLE TONE OF THE STRULAK SPEECH WAS SOMEWHAT STRONGER; HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ALLIED MUST GUARD AGAINST PROCESS OF HARDENING OF POSITIONS THROUGH MERE REPETITION AND SHOULD ACTIVELY SEEK TO EXCHANGE NEW IDEAS AND MOVE THE TALKS AHEAD OR BOTH SIDES WILL BECOME INFLEXIBLE.

6. US DEP REP NOTED THAT IN COUNTERING THE EASTERN INFERENCE THAT IT IS THE WESTERN NUCLEAR WEAPONS RATHER THAN EASTERN

CONVENTIONAL FORCES THAT ARE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING, THE ALLIES SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE EAST ALSO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA, RATHER THAN WEST ALONE AS IMPLIED BY STRULAK REMARKS AND KLEIN PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD ADD CREDENCE TO THE ALLIED CONTENTION THAT THE CONVENTIONAL GROUND FORCE IMBALANCE COULD LEAD TO A NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

7 CANADIAN DPE REP (MORGAN) AGREED THAT THE ALLIES MUST STRESS THE INEQUALITY OF GROUND FORCES AS THE POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING FACTOR. HE FURTHER STATED THAT STRULAK'S EXPRESSION OF SURPRISE AT THE ALLIES CONTENDING THAT CONVENTIONAL FORCES WERE MORE LIKELY TO PROVOKE A NUCLEAR CONFLICT THAN NUCLEAR FORCES SEEMED TO BORDER ON PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTATION, SOMETHING THE EAST HAD NOT ENGAGED IN IN THE PAST. THE CANADIAN DEP REP SAID HE FELT STRULAK DISTINGUISHED BETWEEN AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE ONE HAND AND NATIONAL FORCES ON THE OTHER. HE HAD SAID AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES HAD TO BE INCLUDED, BUT NO REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THEIR INCLUSION FROM THE OUTSET, WHILE IT WAS STRESSED THAT NATIONAL FORCES MUST BE INCLUDED FROM THE BEGINNING.

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 00618 02 OF 05 241334Z

46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 VIENNA 0618

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

BILATERALS WITH EAST

8. THE CHAIRMAN DIRECTED THE GROUP'S ATTENTION TO TWO REPORTS DISTRIBUTED BY THE US DEL: CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET DELOFF KVITSINSKIY ON JAN 21 (SEPTTEL); AND DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV, SMIRNOVSKY AND KVITSINSKIY ON JAN 17 (VIENNA 491).

9. US REP SAID HE WANTED THE GROUP TO TAKE NOTE OF THREE POINTS IN RELATION TO THESE BILATERAL CONVERSATIONS. THESE WERE THE REFERENCE DURING THE MEETING ON JAN 17 THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONSIDER A COMMON CEILING IF BOTH AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER WERE CONSIDERED. THE SECOND WAS THE CHANGING SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER DISPARITY IF BOTH AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER WERE CONSIDERED. THE THIRD POINT WAS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE CAREFUL HOW THEY USE INFORMATION GATHERED VIA BILATERALS IN FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH EASTERN REPS. IF USED IMPRUDENTLY, SECRET

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 02 OF 05 241334Z

TLY, IN WAY WHICH CAUSE OF EMBARRASSMENT TO EASTERN SOURCES, THE EAST WILL BE RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE IN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE WEST AND FREEDOM OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE DIMINISHED. ANOTHER ITEM OF INTEREST TO THE US REP WAS THAT KVITSINSKIY THINKS THAT PRESENT DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH ON PROCEDURES CAN BE OVERCOME. US REP WAS NOT PESSIMISTIC ABOUT A REDUCTION IN THE FREQUENCY OF PLENARIES.

10. THE UK REP AGREED THAT WE MUST NOT EMBARRASS THE EAST OR WE WILL INHIBIT CONTACTS WITH EAST; HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT HE FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT AS AN INDICATION OF ALLIED SOLIDARITY FOR ALL THE ALLIES TO INDICATE TO THE EAST THAT ALLIES DO CIRCULATE INFORMATION GATHERED VIA BILATERALS THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN GROUP.

11. THE FRG REP NOTED THAT WHILE THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS CIRCULATED THEIR BILATERALS REPORTS AMONG EACH OTHER, SUCH WAS NOT THE CASE WITH THE EAST AND THAT THIS WAS AN ADDITIONAL REASON FOR NOT LOSING THIS INFORMAL METHOD OF CONTACT.

12. THE FRG REP SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ONLY KVITSINSKIY OF EASTERN REPS HAD INDICATED POSSIBILITY OF CONSIDERING A COMMON CEILING. US DEP REP NOTED THAT KVITSINSKIY HAD MADE HIS MOST RECENT REMARKS ON THIS TOPIC IN THE PRESENCE OF KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY AND THAT NEITHER HAD DISAGREED.

13. CANADIAN DEP REP REPORTED CONVERSATION ON JAN 17 BETWEEN CANADIAN REP AND RUMANIAN DEP REP (POPESCU) WHO HAD SPECIFICALLY ASKED CANADIAN REP TO REPORT HIS VIEWS TO THE AD HOC GROUP. PO-

PESCU SAID THAT THE ROMANIANS WANTED PLENARY MEETINGS TO BE HELD WITH REGULARITY, BUT THE SPECIFIC NUMBER AND FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS WERE UNIMPORTANT. THE ROMANIANS FELT THAT ALL PARTIES MUST BE REPRESENTED AT ALL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THEY DID NOT APPROVE OF THE EMISSARY SYSTEM SINCE NO ONE COULD REPRESENT ROMANIA AND THEY COULD REPRESENT NO ONE. POPESCU SAID HE FELT INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN NUCLEAR FORCES AS SUCH AND INDICATED THAT THE SOVIETS SHARED THIS VIEW. POPESCU ALSO PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF INCLUDING FRG FORCES IN AN INITIAL AGREEMENT.

14. THE FRG REP REPORTED ON AN 18 JAN MEETING BETWEEN FRG DEP REP (HOFMANN) AND ROMANIAN DEP REP (POPESCU). POPESCU WAS STRONG-SECRET

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PAGE 03 VIENNA 00618 02 OF 05 241334Z

LY OPPOSED TO THE EMISSARY SYSTEM AS THIS WOULD NOT ENABLE THE ROMANIANS TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE DEMANDED TO BE INFORMED OF THE CONTENT OF MEETINGS CONDUCTED UNDER THE EMISSARY SYSTEM AND SAID ROMANIANS WOULD CONSIDER WALKOUT FROM VIENNA AND/OR TAKING THE MATTER TO THE PRESS IF THE ROMANIANS WERE NOT REPRESENTED IN DISCUSSIONS OF THE SUBJECT MATTER. POPESCU SAID THE SOVIETS DO NOT KEEP THE ROMANIANS INFORMED OF THEIR CONTACTS AND THAT IF THE EMISSARY SYSTEM WERE RESORTED TO, ROMANIA WOULD BE IN SAME CATEGORY AS YUGOSLAVIA. THE ROMANIANS WOULD LIKE TO SEE A REGULARIZED SCHEDULE OF PLENARIES, BUT DID NOT CONSIDER THE ACTUAL NUMBER TO BE OF IMPORTANCE.

15. FRG REP CONTINUED HIS REPORT WITH AN ACCOUNT OF A CONTACT HE HAD WITH POLISH REP STRULAK. POLISH REP SAID THAT POLAND HAD SOME DOUBTS ABOUT SMALL INFORMAL MEETINGS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPANTS. STRULAK SAID IF ONLY SOVIET FORCES IN GDR WERE ADDRESSED IN THESE MEETINGS POLAND WOULD HAVE NO ROLE AND NO BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION, WHICH WOULD BE A BAD OUTCOME. STRULAK WAS INSISTENT ON THE NECESSITY OF INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES IN ANY AGREEMENT, REFERRING TO THE POLISH CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, BUT DID NOT MENTION ANY REFERENCE TO THE INCLUSION OF AIR FORCES. THE POLISH REP INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE MANPOWER COMPARISONS WERE A VALID INDICATION OF COMBAT CAPABILITY AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR ANY AGREEMENT TO INCLUDE ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS MANPOWER. STRULAK INDICATED HIS SUPPORT FOR SOVIET INSISTENCE ON THE INCLUSIONS OF FRG FORCES FROM THE BEGINNING.

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 00618 03 OF 05 241424Z

46

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 VIENNA 0618

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

16. NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THAT RECENT EASTERN REFERENCES TO AIR AND GROUND MANPOWER FIGURES ARE VERY INTERESTING. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE AHG LOOK INTO THE IMPLICATION OF THESE FIGURES FOR THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND WESTERN TACTICS.

17. UK REP SAID ANY POLICY CHANGES ON THESE ISSUES WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED AT NATO THOUGH AD HOC GROUP COULD MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS. ITALIAN REP SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD LOOK INTO THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT IF AIR MANPOWER WERE INCLUDED THE DISPARITY IN MANPOWER FIGURES WOULD BE MITIGATED.

18. THE US REP SAID THAT HE EXPECTED WASHINGTON TO FORWARD NEW US ESTIMATES ON WARSAW PACT AIR MANPOWER TO NATO SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT THE  
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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 03 OF 05 241424Z

PRESENT NATO FIGURES INDICATED THAT IF AIR MAN-  
POWER WERE INCLUDED THE 150,000 MAN DISPARITY  
IN GROUND FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED TO AN EASTERN

ADVANTAGE OF 60,000. HE SAID THAT FROM WHAT HE HAD HEARD OF NEW FIGURES, THEY APPEARED TO INDICATE A BALANCE IN AIR MANPOWER AND THEREFORE THEIR INCLUSION WOULD NOT NARROW THE GAP AS REGARDS CONVENTIONAL FORCES. THE NETHERLANDS REP NOTED THIS INFORMATION SHOULD REINFORCE THE ALLIED CON- TENTION THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON GROUND FORCES SINCE THAT IS WHERE THE DISPARITY LIES. THE UK REP SAID HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY THE NEW AIR FIGURES, BUT DID NOT THINK IT WAS THE TASK OF THE VIENNA DATA GROUP OR AD HOC GROUP TO ASSESS THEIR IMPLICA- TIONS; THIS MUST BE DONE IN BRUSSELS. THE US REP AGREED WITH THIS, BUT FELT THE VIENNA DATA GROUP SHOULD REVIEW AND PRESENT NEW FIGURES WHEN AVAIL- ABLE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE AHG CAN ASSESS THEIR IMPLICATION FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.

#### TACTICS PAPER

19. CHAIRMAN THEN OPENED DISCUSSION ON THE TACTICS PAPER (VIENNA 0401 AND 0482). UK REP STATED THAT HE HAD FINALLY RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL DETAILED INSTRUC- TIONS FROM LONDON, ESPECIALLY ON PARAS 5, 6 AND 7. UK FONOFF FEELS THAT IN PRESENT FORMULATION OF PARA 5 NATO IS GIVING UP TOO MUCH FOR A SMALL SOVIET SHIFT; NATO AGREEMENT THAT PHASE 2 NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN AFTER A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME IS A SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION IF GIVEN WITHOUT A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING. THEREFORE, IN FOREIGN OFFICE VIEW, ALL OF PARA 5 SHOULD BE DELETED AFTER THE FIRST SENTENCE. THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 6 ALSO CAUSED PROBLEMS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND A FORMULA THAT DOES NOT SINGLE OUT THE FRG AND THAT DOES NOT COMMIT NATO TO REDUCTIONS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS WRITTEN; THE SENTENCE COULD IMPLY THAT ALL EUROPEAN FORCES (INCLUDING THE UK) WOULD BE RE- DUCED. THEREFORE THE LAST SENTENCE SHOULD READ: "IF THE RUSSIANS PERSIST IN ASKING WHETHER 'OTHER FORCES' WOULD INCLUDE BUNDESWEHR, ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES COULD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 00618 03 OF 05 241424Z

POINT OUT THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IS AMONG THE ALLIED DIRECT PARTICIPANTS."

20. UK REP SAID FONOFF FELT THE DIFFICULTY WITH PARA 7 IS THAT THE SPECIFIC ALLUSION TO A SOVIET RIGHT TO RAISE SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THEM COULD IMPLY THAT THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES IS NEGOTIABLE. THEREFORE, PARA 7 SHOULD EITHER BE DELETED, OR IT SHOULD READ: "IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET REQUESTS FOR ALLIED ASSURANCES ON INCLUSION

ON AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES, THE ALLIES COULD SAY THAT THEIR MAIN INTEREST WAS IN DISCUSSING THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT IN WHICH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES. THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO REJECT THE INCLUSION OF AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES."

21. CANADIAN DEPREP ASKED UK REP TO TELL THE GROUP WHAT IN UK VIEW COULD BE OFFERED TO THE EAST AS AN INDUCEMENT FOR THEIR PROCEDURAL AGREEMENT IF ALL THE PROPOSED UK CHANGES WERE ACCEPTED. UK REP RESPONDED THAT THE FIRST PART OF PARAS 5 AND 6 WOULD BE OFFERED. US DEPREP NOTED THAT SUBSTANCE OF FIRST SENTENCE OF PARA 5 INCLUDED IN ALLIED PLENARY STATEMENTS, NOTABLY CANADIAN STATEMENT OF JANUARY 17, THAT "FOCUS" LANGUAGE AS REGARDS COVERAGE IN PHASE 2 DID NOT DIFFER ESSENTIALLY FROM FORMULA REPEATEDLY USED IN ALLIED PLENARIES THAT PHASE 2 WOULD "INCLUDE" FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND THAT ALLIES WERE GIVING SOVIETS NOTHING ON NUCLEARS ON AIR IN THE PROPOSED FORMULATIONS. THE UK HAD LEFT STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVE INTACT IN PAPER AND HAD KATKEN AWAY THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE IT. UK REP REPLIED THAT THE MAIN POINT OF CONCERN TO LONDON WAS THAT NATO WAS ASKING FOR SOMETHING SMALL AND OFFERING SOMETHING SIGNIFICANT.

22. NETHERLANDS REP POINTED OUT THAT ALLIES WOULD NOT BE MAKING CONCESSIONS SIMPLY TO OBTAIN A DISCUSSION OF SOVIET/US REDUCTIONS; THE ALLIES ARE NOT GOING TO GIVE UP ANYTING SIGNIFICANT FOR TALK ALSONE. THE ULTIMATE ALLIED PURPOSE IS TO CONVINCE THE PACT TO ACCEPT SOVIET/US REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND A GROUND FORCE COMMON  
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SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 00618 03 OF 05 241424Z

CEILING. TO GET THIS AGREEMENT, THE ALLIES MUST EVENTUALLY PUT SOME SUBSTANCE INTO THE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THIS LINK WOULD ACTUALLY GO IN AN AGREEMENT ONLY IF THE EAST AGREED TO ASYMMETRICAL SOVIET/US REDUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PHASE AND A COMMON CEILING TO BE ACHIEVED IN THE SECOND PHASE. US REP COMMENTED THAT AN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING IS CONTEMPORATED AS PART OF PHASE I, AND A STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT MIGHT BE PUT IN PARA 5. THE US DOES NOT WANT A PHASE I AGREEMENT WITHOUT AGREEMENT TO A COMMON CEILING. BUT ALLIES DID NEED MINIMUM AMMUNITION TO SERVE AS BASIS OF DISCUSSION WITH SOVIETS. FIXED PERIOD WAS ONLY NEW ELEMENT AT ALL IN TACTICS PAPER.

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SECRET

PAGE 01 VIENNA 00618 04 OF 05 241426Z

41

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-11 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 VIENNA 0618

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

2\*. ITALIAN REP STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT PARA 5 BEFORE, BECAUSE THE ALLIED POSITION APPEARED TO BE THAT A COMMITMENT TO THE INCLUSION OF ALL NATIONAL FORCES IN PHASE 2 WOULD BE TRADED FOR A SOVIET AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS SOVIET/US FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS. NOW THAT UK FONOFF HAD OBJECTED, HE INSISTED THIS POINT MUST BE CLARIFIED OR AGREEMENT ON PAPER WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. US DEPREP POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS NO REAL SOVIET INTEREST IN A "FIXED PERIOD OF TIME" AS SUCH, BUT RATHER IN DETAILS OF PHASE II. IF THEY NEVERTHELESS ACCEPTED ALLIED LANGUAGE ON LINKAGE, THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTING THE WESTERN PHASING CONCEPT. THIS WOULD BE A USEFUL CONCESSION FROM EAST BECAUSE THEY WOULD BE ACCEPTING IN PART THE TWO/PHASE PROGRAM WHICH THE ALLIES WANT. THUS, INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS FIXED PERIOD AT LATER POINT WOULD NOT BE A SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION ON PART OF ALLIES, BUT ITS ACCEPTANCE BY EAST AS ALLIED CLARIFICATION WOULD BE A GAIN FOR ALLIES. NATO MUST OFFER THE EAST SOME LIMITED INDUCEMENT TO ENT-

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 04 OF 05 241426Z

ER THE TACTICAL UNDERSTANDING PROPOSED. THE UK PROPOSALS DO NOT OFFER ANYTHING; IF FOLLOWED THERE WOULD BE LITTLE OR NO PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. PERHAPS LONDON DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROPOSALS UNDER DISCUSSION. ALLIES WERE FACED WITH EASTERN DEMAND TO NEGOTIATE ALL FORCES SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND IT WAS NECESSARY TO BRING THEM OFF THIS IF ALLIED APPROACH WERE TO HAVE ANY CHANCE. UK REP RESPONDED THAT HE HAD FAITHFULLY REPORTED ALL VIEWS AND THEY HAD ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED IN LONDON. BELGIAN REP STATED THAT HE AGREED WITH THE US DEPREP THAT IF THE EAST ACCEPTED THE PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENT, IT WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT THEY HAD ACCEPTED OUR PHASING CONCEPT. IT WAS TIME TO MOVE IN THIS WHOLE AFFAIR. DELAY COULD BE COSTLY.

24. ITALIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS THE THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA 5 COULD BE CHANGED TO READ "... THE ALLIES, AFTER CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT BASED ON THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START WITHIN A 'FIXED PERIOD OF TIME'..." NETHERLANDS REP ASKED IF THIS MEANT THAT THE ALLIES COULD ONLY MAKE THAT STATEMENT AFTER A PHASE I AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED. IF SO, IT WAS UNUSABLE. HE FELT THAT NATO SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE COMMON CEILING IS A MAINSTAY OF ITS POSITION AND THAT THIS IDEA SHOULD BE MADE EXPLICIT IN THIS PAPER. US REP SUGGESTED THAT LANGUAGE FROM PARA 6 MIGHT ALSO BE PLACED IN THIRD SENTENCE OF PARA 5. INSTEAD OF THE PROPOSED ITALIAN CHANGE, REVISED SENTENCE MIGHT READ: "... THE ALLIES, FOLLOWING A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, COULD STATE THEIR VIEW THAT SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS COULD START WITHIN A 'FIXED PERIOD OF TIME'..." NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT THIS CHANGE MIGHT STRENGTHEN NATO'S POINT. CANADIAN DEPREP AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE REALLY CONCERNED WITH THE CONTENT OF PHASE 2 AND TO BE SURE PHASE 2 ACTUALLY TAKES PLACE, NOT WITH ITS TIMING. THEREFORE, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO REVERSE PARAS 5 AND 6 IN THIS PAPER.

25. UK REP STATED THAT US REP'S INSERTION IN PARA 5 WAS AN IMPROVEMENT TO THE DOCUMENT. HOWEVER, AS EXPLAINED IN PARA 4, PARAS 5 AND 6 ARE TO BE USED TO REACH THE GOALS LISTED IN PARA 2. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT PARA 4 PROVIDED FOR THE ALLIES TO BE CAREFUL TO FORMULATE TALKING POINTS AND NOT GIVE A COMMITMENT TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC NATIONAL FORCES OR AIR AND NUCLEAR ELEMENTS IN PHASE 2. UK REP CONTENDED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THE SOVIETS WOULD

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 00618 04 OF 05 241426Z

IGNORE THE ALLIED QUALIFICATIONS AND ASSUME THAT NATO IS COMMITTED TO INCLUDE ALL NATIONAL FORCES IN PHASE 2. US DEPREP STATED THAT IT WAS UP TO WESTERN NEGOTIATORS TO INSURE THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT IGNORE THOSE ALLIED QUALIFICATIONS. NETHERLANDS REP STATED THAT PRESENT TEXT WAS NOT YET IN FORM OF A NEGOTIATING

BRIEF. US REP STATED THAT THE LANGUAGE IN PARA 4 WAS INTENDED TO MAKE POINT THAT NATO'S NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT NOW, BUT ONLY TO SAY THAT PHASE 2 WILL BEGIN WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME, PROVIDING THAT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT IS AGREED, AND REMAINDER OF AGREEMENT IS SATISFACTORY.

26. ITALINA REP SAID THAT THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND AGREEMENT ON NUMERICAL LEVEL IS THE KEY TO A FUTURE AGREEMENT. THIS WAS NOT SO OF FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND/OR FIRST PHASE LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS. CANADIAN DEPREP STATED THAT HE HAD ASSUMED THAT COMMON CEILING MEANT A GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING. US REP COMMENTED THAT AN OFFER MADE BY NATO COULD ONLY BE ACCEPTED IN THE FORM MADE AND THAT NATO WOULD NOT BE LEGALLY BOUND TO AN EASTERN COUNTER-OFFER SUCH AS ONE FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES. ITALIAN REP ASKED WHY THE WORDS GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PAPER. US REP RESPONDED THAT NATO HAD EMPHASIZED ITS INTEREST IN THE GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING IN A NUMBER OF PLENARY STATEMENTS. ITALIAN REP REJOINED THAT TO INCLUDE THE WORDS GROUND FORCES MIGHT PRECLUDE A MISINTERPRETATION. US REP STATED THAT THE NEGOTIATORS' TALKING POINTS MIGHT DO THIS, AND OF COURSE IT COULD BE ADDED TO TEXT.

SECRET

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PAGE 01 VIENNA 00618 05 OF 05 241425Z

44

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 OMB-01 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 VIENNA 0618

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

NETHERLANDS REP ADDED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD BE WARY OF THESE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS. A GOOD WAY TO NEITHER ACCEPT NOR REJECT EITHER SIDE'S SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS IS TO HOLD BACK ON OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE LINK BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES. THE UK AND ITALIAN REPS WERE CORRECT IN SAYING THAT ALLIES SHOULD NOT MAKE ALL OUR CONCESSIONS AT ONCE. US REP COMMENTED THAT ALLIES SHOULD BE CLEAR ABOUT OVERAL SITUATION--THAT THE FIXED EASTERN POSITION, FREQUENTLY REPEATED IN THEIR PLENARY STATEMENTS, WAS TO EMPHASIZE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION OF NATIONAL, NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE WAS TO POSTPONE THE NATIONAL PHASE OF REDUCTIONS TO A SECOND PHASE AND THEREFORE THE SOVIETS MUST BE GIVEN SOME INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE. THE UK VIEWS WERE A STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM, NOT A SOLUTION TO IT.

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PAGE 02 VIENNA 00618 05 OF 05 241425Z

27. THE ITALIAN REP SAID THAT THE TACTICS PAPER COVERED TOO MUCH GROUND. THE DISCUSSIONS ENVISIONED HERE WILL ONLY COVER THE NEXT TWO MONTHS; THEREFORE, THE AHG SHOULD ONLY KEEP THE FIRST PHASE PART OF PARAGRAPH 5 AND PREPARE ANOTHER PAPER REGARDING LINKAGE TO PHASE 2 WHEN THE PROPER TIME COMES. UK REP AGREED AND CONTENDED THAT THE AHG SHOULD NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS TACTIC WILL COMMIT THE EAST. THEY ARE NOT BOUND TO DO ANYTHING BUT TALK, AND NATO WILL HVE GONE QUITE A WAY BEYOND ITS CURRENT POSITION.

28. THE CHAIRMAN CONCLUDED THAT THESE ISSUES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED IN PRESENT SESSION AND SUGGESTED DISCUSSION BE CONTINUED IN NEXT DAY'S MEETING. HUMES

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